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Having been arrested on November 11, 1923, after the failure of the "beer hall putsch," Adolf 
Hitler was imprisoned at Landsberg Castle, in a "large, airy, and comfortably furnished" cell, 
where he dictated an account of his life and "worldview" (Weltanschauung) to Emile Maurice 
and Rudolf Hess in 1924. The manuscript he produced was published as My Struggle (Mein 
Kampf) in 1925. In it, Hitler firmly stated his beliefs on a wide variety of topics, including 
education. Even at this early date, education formed a key component in Hitler's designs for 
the future of the German nation. For example, he stated that "[f]rom all the innumerable great 
names in German history, the greatest must be picked out and introduced to the youth so 
persistently that they become pillars of an unshakeable national sentiment." Hitler's ideas on 
education came to underpin the Nazis' goals for transforming German society once they came 
to power. In a speech to representatives of the press on March 15, 1933, Josef Goebbels, 
Minister for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, asserted that "[i]t is not enough to 
reconcile people more or less to our regime, to move them towards a position of neutrality 
towards us, we would rather work on people until they are addicted to us."
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 This chapter explores the centrality of education to the Nazi regime, highlighting the 
social construction of ignorance in Germany during the period from 1933 to 1945. It 
examines both the perpetuation of ignorance by the Nazi administration through the use of 
censorship, propaganda, and disinformation, and the efforts of the Nazi leadership at various 
types of miseducation of German children in schools, which were designed to generate 
unquestioning faith and belief in the Nazi system. As such, it contributes to the study of 
ignorance and its social construction by examining the policies of the National Socialist 
government, which disinformed the German population in a variety of ways. Recent 
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scholarship has begun to explore the active engineering of ignorance, the kind of ignorance 
that can be "made, maintained and manipulated" as a "strategic ploy" or "active construct." 
This was undoubtedly the case on the part of the Nazi regime. The creation and preservation 
of ignorance by the Nazi government covered a wide range of aspects of German life, many 
of which were interrelated. It was purposefully orchestrated in order to deter any large-scale 
resistance or even non-conformity to the regime and its ideology.
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 The focus of this chapter is on three key areas: the promotion of Nazi ideology and 
the perpetuation of myths; the censorship of artistic and cultural life; and the control of the 
content of school textbooks. The first part of the chapter illustrates how the Nazi regime 
utilized miseducation or disinformation in order to promote its ideological imperatives of 
"racial purity" and anti-Semitism. In addition, it shows how the Nazi administration 
employed disinformation to legitimate its racial hygiene policies to "improve" the quality and 
quantity of the German population and how it sought to promote the "national community" 
(Volksgemeinschaft) and nationalism more generally. It illustrates how the Nazi regime 
perpetuated (through the use of propaganda) all types of myths, which were accepted by the 
German population for much of the Third Reich--using the myth surrounding the "leader" 
(Führer) and his infallibility and the perpetuation of the myth of the omniscient and 
omnipresent secret state police, the Gestapo, as key examples. The next part of the chapter 
considers how the Nazi government clamped down upon and censored entire realms of 
artistic and cultural life that did not conform to its attitudes about German art and German 
literature. The last section of the chapter examines the Nazi censorship of school textbooks, 
in order to create homogeneity in what was taught. An analysis of these three broad areas 
illuminates the determined use of disinformation and miseducation by the Nazi government 
in Germany between 1933 and 1945. 
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The promotion of Nazi ideology and the perpetuation of myths 
Nazi ideological imperatives lay at the heart of the regime's attempts both to construct its 
ideal society and to promote its worldview to the German "national comrades" 
(Volksgenossen). The regime disseminated its ideology, using film and other media to spread 
its message about anti-Semitism and the eradication of the "unfit." Similarly, it employed 
such channels of information and knowledge to advocate its nationalist ideology and to 
perpetuate myths to convince and instruct its population. Racial purity, the concept of the 
"master race" (Herrenvolk), and anti-Semitism were core aspects of Nazi ideology. The 
regime built upon and created popular mistrust towards the Jews by means of propaganda--in 
particular, through the use of posters, as well as The Stormer (Der Stürmer), an anti-Semitic 
journal published under the aegis of Julius Streicher, the regional leader (Gauleiter) of 
Franconia. The front cover of the September 1943 issue, for example, featured a photograph 
of a Jew with the caption "Satan." In addition, a trilogy of films about the Jews was screened 
in 1940--The Rothschilds (Die Rothschilds), Jew Süss (Jud Süss), and The Eternal Jew (Der 
ewige Jude). These films sought to instruct the German population about the "threat" posed 
by the Jews. The first of these, Die Rothschilds, was an attempt to explain the rise to power 
and wealth of the Rothschild family and the emergence of the "Jewish British plutocracy." It 
revealed the "historical fact" that Jewish financiers had profited from the death of German 
soldiers. In doing so, it rationalized the extermination of the Jews as expressed in Hitler's 
Mein Kampf and in his speeches. In Die Rothschilds, the Jews were portrayed as a racial and 
economic threat.
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 Veit Harlan's Jud Süss showed the inherent rootlessness of the Jewish people and 
their ability to assimilate into any society. Süss, the elegant and fashionable Jewish lawyer, 
personified "the Jew in disguise." Eric Rentschler has shown that in "constructing a 
malevolent other, Nazi propagandists insisted that they were serving the public good by 
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revealing the Jew's true face." The rest of the Jews in the film were portrayed as dirty, hook 
nosed, and physically repellent. They represented "authentic Jewry." In contrast, the true 
"Aryan" prototypes were depicted--for example, Dorothea, the classic German maiden played 
by Christina Söderbaum. This film unquestionably contributed to the anti-Semitism already 
prevalent in Germany, for it brought together archetypes and themes that created the desired 
antipathy towards the Jews under the guise of entertainment that resulted in great box office 
success. Rentschler notes "it not only confirmed existing prejudices; it agitated, militated, and 
called for action." This was intentional engineering on the part of the National Socialist 
government and its propaganda machine.
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 In its efforts to "educate" the German population, Fritz Hippler's Der ewige Jude 
covered the entire gamut of Nazi allegations against the Jews. It was one of the most virulent 
and effective propaganda films ever made. A large part of its strength lay in its pretence of 
documentary objectivity. Whereas Jud Süss was a period costume feature whose message 
was, nevertheless, crystal clear, Der ewige Jude claimed to be a documentary film about 
world Jewry. The substance and message of the film very much reflected the idea that the 
Jew had cunningly assimilated himself into European society. Furthermore, by associating 
Jews with rats, the audience was led to believe that they were disease bearers and subhuman. 
Next, statistics were produced to show that Jews figured predominantly in the world of crime, 
out of all proportion to their number in the population, but no source was given for the 
figures. The film showed images of Jews with beards, long hair, and skullcaps. Each shot 
faded into one of the same man "disguised" in European clothing. In this way, the Jews were 
portrayed as an almost invisible threat to the health of the "Aryan" race. By showing pictures 
of Jews in prominent positions of world power, for example, the financial houses of Jews 
such as the Rothschilds, the Warburgs and the Montefiores, the film played on the myth of 
the "international Jewish conspiracy." It also exacerbated sentiments of jealousy, indignation, 
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and resentment by showing the disproportionate number of Jews in the upper echelons of 
society during the Weimar Republic and their corresponding disproportionate absence from 
the more menial strata. Finally, after this great profusion of images and rhetoric, the viewer 
was confronted with the slaughterhouse scene--anti-Semitic propaganda at its most extreme. 
The inflammatory scenes were immediately followed by shots of Hitler's Reichstag speech of 
January 30, 1939, in which he prophesied that a forthcoming war would bring about "the 
annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe." A sequence of blonde Aryan stereotypes 
concluded the film. These three films were intended to teach a particular message about the 
Jews to the German population at a time when the Nazi leadership sought increasingly drastic 
"solutions" to "the Jewish Question." They formed a central component of the efforts of the 
Nazi government to demonize the Jews and to assert a whole array of allegations against the 
Jews that misinformed the German populace. 
 In addition, the Nazi government employed disinformation to legitimate its racial 
hygiene policies to "improve" the quality and quantity of the German population. The regime 
introduced eugenic measures to this end, including compulsory sterilization. Policies directed 
against the physically and mentally ill, eventually culminated in their mass murder 
(Operation T4) during the war. Nazi educational and propaganda material showed the high 
costs of welfare for people the regime considered to be "inferior" or even "unworthy of life" 
that could be saved and spent instead on more "worthy" or "valuable" members of the 
German "national community." In October 1939, Viktor Brack, one of the creators of the T4 
scheme, commissioned Hermann Schweninger to make propaganda films on the subject of 
"euthanasia." These too were educative in nature. The aim was to juxtapose the expense put 
into maintaining "ballast existences" with the limited therapeutic results achieved. In 1935, 
21 million people watched these films that stigmatized the mentally ill and this number rose 
to 40 million in 1939. They contrasted the most shocking cases of children and adults with 
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physical disabilities and mental illnesses with the luxuriously appointed, expensive and 
modern asylums with attractive gardens and grounds, in order to appeal to the "healthy" 
instincts of the German nation and to convince ordinary Germans that this money could be 
better spent on more deserving causes. After 1940, a different approach was taken to achieve 
this end: the production of a feature film instead of documentaries. The feature film I Accuse 
(Ich klage an), on the subject of "euthanasia," was released in August 1941. Eighteen million 
people watched this film. Nazi reports compiled by the Security Service of the SS in January 
1942 suggested that the film was "favourably received and discussed" and "enthusiastically 
received." The film showed a medical professor named Heyt, whose young wife had multiple 
sclerosis. He killed her with a morphine overdose and was subsequently tried for murder. The 
aim of the film was to show that the law should be changed in order to permit "mercy 
killings" and clearly audiences were encouraged to take this view. Goebbels was astute in his 
judgement that messages could be effectively taught through the medium of feature films, not 
just through overtly propagandistic films.
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 Hitler's government wanted to instruct the population in other ways too, such as the 
Nazi propaganda effort that sought to promote the "national community" and nationalism, in 
line with another central aspect of Nazi ideology--the resurrection of the fortunes of the 
German nation. Educational and propaganda material emphasized the greatness of Germany 
as well as the need for people to put the national interest before their own interests. This 
manifested itself the use of nationalistic slogans captured in the poster "One People! One 
Reich! One Führer!" The concept of "the community before the individual" (Gemeinnutz vor 
Eigennutz) sought to encourage a sense of nationalism and pride of homeland. Another 
illustration of this was the way in which the Nazi government linked home economy to the 
national economy, and encouraged German housewives to think about their duties to the 
nation in their purchasing decisions. Historian Nancy Reagin has shown how the regime 
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"persistently linked women's frugal use of available resources to the national interest," 
especially after the introduction of the Four Year Plan and during the war. A further instance 
of this was the Nazi concept of health as a responsibility towards the "nation" (Volk), not just 
as the concern of the individual. The close relationship between "individual and collective 
physical health" was a central component of the state and society in the Third Reich. The 
"national community" was central to concepts of German society under National Socialism 
and a vast array of educational and propaganda material highlighted its importance to the 
German populace.
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 The Nazi regime perpetuated a number of myths, which were accepted by the German 
population for much of the Nazi period. Prominent examples include the following: the 
"Hitler myth;" the myth of a "classless society," in which the working class could gain access 
to the privileges that were previously restricted to the middle and upper classes, and which 
convinced the workers that the regime benefited them; and the legend of the omniscient and 
omnipresent Gestapo, which created fear among the German population and thus inhibited 
criticism of the regime or its policies. Furthermore, the Nazi propaganda machine was used to 
conceal the nationwide impact of Allied bombing, to convince the Germans that they were 
winning the war and to persuade them to continue fighting until the bitter end. Propaganda 
was far removed from reality by this time.
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 Propaganda, in particular the use of radio, posters, films, magazines, and newspapers, 
as well as education at all levels--both formal and informal--contributed to the continued 
belief in such myths. To this end, rallies, parades, posters, feature films, newsreels, the press, 
and the radio were all employed to generate consent for the regime and its aims. Nazi 
propaganda addressed itself to large masses of people in order to create uniformity of opinion 
and action and a re-education of society based upon National Socialist principles. David 
Welch has shown that Nazi propaganda was "as much about confirming as about converting 
8 
 
public opinion." In this sense, Nazi misinformation and disinformation was a way of 
perpetuating ignorance in the German population. Welch shows how Nazi propaganda 
reinforced "existing trends and beliefs, to sharpen and focus them" for its own ends.
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 The "Hitler myth," as Ian Kershaw has argued, was "consciously devised as an 
integrating force by a regime acutely aware of the need to manufacture consensus." Hitler 
was portrayed as the great leader of Germany's destiny. Yet, this heroic leadership was "as 
much an image created by the masses as it was imposed on them."
 
Pierre Ayçoberry states 
that "the construction of the Hitlerian myth resulted from a combination of autosuggestion, 
deliberate fabrication and a quasi-universal acceptance." After the Night of the Long Knives 
(June 30, 1934), for example, Hitler's reputation was elevated, despite the illegality of his 
actions. He was portrayed and regarded as the defender of the "little man" against the "big 
shots" and as the upholder of public morality. Curbing the excesses of the SA appealed to the 
desire of the public for law and order, while the murder of its openly homosexual leader, 
Ernst Röhm, accorded to "the healthy instincts of the people." In addition, the recovery of the 
nation's economy, the massive public works schemes, such as motorway construction, and 
the elimination of mass unemployment in the mid-1930s were regarded as the personal 
achievements of the Führer.
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 Standing above and beyond the day-to-day realities of the regime, Hitler remained 
disassociated from unpopular decisions and from the avarice and hypocrisy of the Party 
functionaries. Hitler was popular as a leader among all social groups and was personally 
exempted from criticisms of the regime. Any blame was directed at other Nazi leaders or 
officials. The Hitler myth enabled people to voice their quotidian grumbles and concerns, and 
yet consent to the Nazi regime as a whole. This co-existence of complaint and compliance is 
significant to our understanding of the nature of popular opinion in the Third Reich. Much of 
the appeal of the Hitler myth was the yearning for security and leadership by a population in 
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disarray and despair. While the regime continued to make achievements and restore order, 
with its visionary leader at its center, popular acceptance persisted. It appeared to offer the 
German population a solution to its social, economic, and political problems and to this 
extent it succeeded in its capture of the popular mind and in its manufacture of consensus.
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 Additionally, the Nazi government won people to the national cause by means of its 
foreign policy successes. A nation brought to its knees by the punitive Treaty of Versailles in 
1919 could only rejoice in Hitler's wholesale revocation of its terms. The "bringing home" of 
the Saarland in 1935 and the march into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936 met with rapturous 
popular approval. These events signified success and recovery for the German nation under 
their great "leader." The Anschluβ with Austria in 1938 was another massive triumph for the 
"national community" and its Führer. While Nazi foreign policy continued to succeed, the 
sense of "national community" was enhanced. Even a nation hesitant to go to war again in 
September 1939 accepted Hitler's decision and reaped the benefits during the initial Blitzkrieg 
successes of the Second World War. Popular support reached its high point after the Nazi 
occupation of Paris in 1940. Hitler was regarded throughout this period as a great wartime 
leader. Kershaw argues that even on "the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union… Hitler's 
popular standing was undiminished, and confidence in his leadership among the great 
majority of the population unbroken." It was only after the tide of the war turned against 
Germany, and in particular after the Battle of Stalingrad in January 1943, that both Hitler's 
infallibility and the strength of the nation began to be called into question. Yet this 
disillusionment was not translated into any determined resistance or revolt. There were a 
number of reasons for this, namely: the Nazis' apparatus of terror remained intact until the 
end of the war; the burdens and strains of the war led people to a reaction of resignation 
rather than rebellion; and Nazism had created an "atomization of social relations" that stood 
in the way of a communal resistance effort. In addition, the manufacture of popular opinion 
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through a manipulation of both information and emotion contributed to this situation.
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 Before the Battle of Stalingrad, direct, personal criticism of Hitler was extremely rare, 
but after Stalingrad, the "Hitler myth" began to falter. The Allied bombing campaigns were 
another significant factor in the decline of the "Hitler myth," particularly from 1943 onwards. 
The bombing caused considerable demoralization and anger directed against the Nazi 
leadership for failing to prevent it, despite continued Nazi propaganda directed at the home 
front. In the months following the July 20, 1944 bomb plot on Hitler's life, the Führer 
retreated from public life. In the last phase of the war, the "Hitler myth" collapsed entirely. 
Hence, the "Führer myth," significant as it was, is not sufficient on its own as an explanation 
for the continuing acceptance of the Nazi regime, particularly after the tide of the war turned 
against Germany.
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 As popular consensus broke down, the use of terror escalated simultaneously. Within 
Himmler's vast SS-SD-police complex, the Gestapo, headed by the ambitious Heinrich 
Müller, became the key link in the system of terror and surveillance in the Nazi state. The 
Gestapo was certainly an institution that instigated fear and terror among the German 
populace. Recent research has shown, however, that the popular image of the Gestapo as 
omniscient and omnipotent is a myth that was instigated by Gestapo leaders and perpetuated 
in the post-war period by historians who accepted the statements of Gestapo leaders at face 
value. Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul have shown that the Gestapo simply did 
not have the necessary manpower resources available to be "omniscient and omnipotent." Its 
leaders carefully adopted the propaganda image of the ubiquitous Gestapo both to intimidate 
German society and to conceal its own deficiencies. But in reality, the Gestapo never 
achieved these mythical levels of repression. Instead, it was an under-staffed and over-
bureaucratized organization, incapable of comprehensive surveillance. Nor did the Gestapo 
comprise ardent believers in Nazi ideology. Many career policemen from the Weimar era 
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who stayed on and adjusted to the new regime made up its ranks. In the Gestapo, as Robert 
Gellately notes, they "played the part of loyal enforcers of the dictatorship's will." Most 
joined the Nazi Party sooner or later, but in 1939, only 3,000 of the Gestapo's approximately 
20,000 employees held an SS rank.
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 In reality, there were remarkably few Gestapo agents on the ground and they relied on 
both amateur and professional helpers. For example, in 1937, the Dusseldorf Gestapo office 
manned by only 126 agents controlled a town of 500,000 inhabitants. The Essen Gestapo 
office comprised 43 agents for a town with 650,000 inhabitants. Gellately has shown the 
largely reactive nature of the Gestapo and has described the method developed by the 
Gestapo as "a kind of auto-policing, or at least an auto-surveillance system." With the co-
operation of neighbours, friends, acquaintances, and family members, the Gestapo could 
infiltrate even the private realm of the home, in order to monitor compliance with the dictates 
of the regime. Without the help of informers, the Gestapo would have been virtually blind. 
Denunciations were the key link in the interactions between the police and the population. 
The Gestapo did not have adequate resources to generate its own cases, but relied heavily 
upon the supply of information from outside. Following denunciations, the Gestapo 
relentlessly pursued and interrogated individuals--often using torture--in order to extort 
statements that led to arrests. But on its own, that is, without the help of informers, the 
Gestapo was not in the position to engage in comprehensive surveillance or perfect 
repression. Hence, a variety of myths such as these played an important part in the Nazi 
disinformation and miseducation of the German populace. These myths comprised an integral 
aspect of the creation and perpetuation of ignorance in Nazi Germany.
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The censorship of art and literature 
Another key Nazi strategy that contributed to ignorance-making was the use of censorship. 
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The Nazi regime banned many types of cultural expression, eclipsing opportunities for 
Germans to learn about and experience, for instance, jazz music and atonal music, as well as 
Expressionist art. Art forms were censored so that the population was left to believe in the 
existence of only a particular type of German culture. In particular this section examines Nazi 
policies towards art and literature. These two aspects of cultural life presented the Nazi 
government significant opportunities to educate and instruct the German population. The 
Nazis used the arts to legitimize their rule by posing as the guardians of true German culture. 
They purged "alien" influences from German artistic and cultural life, claiming that racial 
degeneration was the main cause of aesthetic deterioration. Alan Steinweis has argued that 
"the cultural policies of the Nazi regime were inextricably intertwined with the policies of 
persecution and marginalisation, driven by racist ideology, that were targeted at Jews, Roma 
and Sinti, homosexuals and other groups." Hence, cultural purification constituted a central 
component in the development of the "national community" throughout the duration of the 
Nazi dictatorship and in the broad educative process of the German populace. The Reich 
Chamber for the Visual Arts closely controlled the work of its 42,000 members. In addition, 
it strictly monitored membership so that politically unreliable or "racially inferior" artists 
were ineligible and therefore not allowed to continue to practice their profession. Nazi 
officials expelled prominent artists, such as Paul Klee and Otto Dix, from their positions. 
Many artists and painters whose work was disapproved of by the Nazi regime went into 
exile.
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 The conveying of a particular type of art and culture played a critical part in Nazi 
educational imperatives. The desire of the Nazi regime to purify and cleanse society was 
reflected in its policy towards the arts, with its simultaneous process of encouraging pure and 
wholesome contemporary German art and purging decadent, "degenerate" or unwholesome 
art. The Nazi administration aimed to eliminate all forms of art that it regarded as "alien" or 
